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Incongruous Names: the Humorous




1 As  humorous  devices  go,  proper  names  deserve  more  attention.  If  fictional  proper
names, created for the purpose of a specific narrative, often have semantic and literary
motivations  that  can  be  humorous,  non-fictional  proper  names  of  people,  places,
organizations, books or TV shows/songs and so on, will also have the potential to be
used,  echoed  or  diverted  in  a  playful  way,  relying  on  the  reader’s  encyclopedic
knowledge of  the  referents  and their  linguistic  proficiency.  In  that  respect,  proper
names fit into the humorous devices that involve “a form of [mental] play comprising a
social context, a cognitive process and an emotional response” as well as “expressive
components”  (Martin  [2010: 83,  193]).  More  specifically,  humor  lies  in  the  playful
mismatch between what is expected of a proper name as a lexical unit at the level of
language and what is being done with the proper name in actual speech. 
2 Presented this way, it seems that proper names illustrate a special kind of humor that
pertains  to  the  general  framework  of  humor  as  incongruity  (Attardo  [2014]),  as
confirmed  by  research  on  opposing  semantic  scripts  specific  to  proper  names
(Rutkowski [2016]). However, I would argue that humorous proper names are not just
reduced to expressing these contrasting semantic scripts and that their very linguistic
(lexical-ized) nature is a humorous powerhouse. In fact, proper names may very well be
specialized  in  signaling  metalinguistic  humor,  in  the  sense  that  humorous  effects
derive  either  from  the  obvious  transgressions  of  the  linguistic  constraints  usually
associated with proper names as a nominal unit or from the direct consequences of
their nominal status. In other words, proper names may be used or coined humorously
because they are incongruous morphosyntactic units to begin with. This means that
semantic incongruity, i.e. the main component of the incongruity theory, cannot be the
only ingredient of humorous coinage and use of proper names. Which is why I turned
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to  one  of  the  roots  of  the  incongruity  theory  to  find  other  parameters  that  could
explain why proper names express humor the way they do.
3 It  seems  that  proper  names  inherently  bear  something  of  the  Bergsonian
characterization of humor (Bergson [1911]). Bergson’s theory of humor rests upon the
idea that humor forces the audience to notice a form of rigidity, or rigidification, in an
otherwise  fluid  pattern.  Distractions  operate  a  digression,  or  a  diversion,  from the
“normal” way society, life, a person or language is supposed to behave. They do so by
directing  the  audience’s  attention  toward  the  repetition,  the  exaggeration  and
especially the rigidification of a particular feature. Unnoticed, this feature would not be
humorous;  noticed,  because  exaggerated  and/or  momentarily  frozen,  it  becomes  a
source of humor. I would like to show how proper names express humor through their
inherent,  constructed  lexical  rigidity:  due to  their  status  as  attention-seeking,
semantically-constrained lexicalized nominals, they are lexical distractions that may be
activated to go from truly rigid to truly humorous in context.
4 The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section 1  will  present  an  overview  of  some
theoretical descriptions of humor and connect it with proper names, finishing with a
brief presentation of Bergson’s theory of rigidity and distraction and how it can aptly
be used to describe humorous proper names in English. Section 2 will summarize the
basic properties associated with proper names, some of which may be used to achieve
humor, before detailing different stages at which proper names may be distractions.
Humor in proper names derives from their lexicalized status which both freezes their
form but also their meaning or reference:  humorously used proper names draw on
their inherent rigidity in order to contradict it or to exaggerate it. In Sections 3 and 4,
transgressions  to  the  assumedly  rigid  form  and  meaning  of  proper  names  will  be
explored. I will show how playing on their form can be used to distract the reader from
the basic content of the message the proper name was inserted in. This gradually leads
to  a  second level  of  distraction  and rigidification,  corresponding  to  the  traditional
meaning of “incongruity”, applied to the structure of phrases: the lexical proprial unit
is  inserted  in  a  syntactic  context  that  forces  the  reader  to  reinterpret  its  overall
meaning, giving rise to a surprising gap between the meaning of the original structure
and its actual meaning in context once distorted by the use of a proper name. Finally,
in Section 5, I will describe how, as proper names become lexicalized – this time in the
sense of undergoing fossilization that will lead them to be integrated into the lexicon
(Brinton & Traugott [2005: 45])  –,  the properties attached to their referents also go
through some kind of  reduction and rigidification that  may give  rise  to  humorous
effects, by making proper names degree expressions used to exaggerate their referent’s
properties.
 
1. Theories of humor: why a Bergsonian approach to
incongruous proper names?
5 I will start this review with somewhat of an obvious statement: “There is no universally
accepted definition of humor” (Gulas & Weinberger [2006] quoted in Warren & McGraw
[2016: 407]).  Instead,  humor has given rise to multiple theories or even “families of
theories”, the two most important of which are the psychological-psychoanalytical and
the social theories of humor (Mulder & Nijholt [2002], Popescu [2003]). Within these
families,  three  major  trends  emerge  that  define  humor  as  either  an  expression  of
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disparagement of the addressee and/or a third party and superiority of the speaker
(Superiority Theory), a means to release tensions (Relief Theory), or simply a tool used
to facilitate integration and interaction within a community, to solve problems or to
avoid problematic situations by playing the “it was just a joke” card and taking back
what had just been said (see Attardo [1994: 323] on social management, decommitment,
mediation and defunctionalization).  Bergson’s  theory of  humor belongs to  that  last
trend of social theories of humor, since he describes laughter as the expression of a
social judgement upon something perceived as abnormal that needs correcting in order
to be  accepted again.  Because proper  names are  primarily  used to  refer  to  people,
institutionalized  places  and  times,  as  well  as  human  productions,  and  because
understanding a proper name requires the (co)speakers to conjure a set of encyclopedic
properties attached to its referent, they are inherently part of a social dynamic: using a
proper name, be it humorous or not, is a social act. Choosing to coin a humorous proper
name,  or  to  use  a  non-humorous  proper  name  so  that  the  result is  considered
humorous, is a social statement.
6 Which begs the following questions: what is considered humorous and how is humor
achieved? A first approach would be to look for humor in the symptoms it provokes –
hence  the  wealth  of  studies  on  the  functions  and  meanings  of  laughter,  and the
immediate connection made between humor and some form of pleasure. For instance,
Apter’s  theory  of  reversals  [1977]  posits  that  humor  occurs  when  someone  is  in  a
“paratelic” state – i.e.,  a state in which actions are meant to be done or interpreted
without any goal in mind, as opposed to a “telic” state which is goal-oriented –, easily
reduced  to  a  non-serious  state.  Processing  visual,  verbal  or  social  stimuli  triggers
arousal, which, in large quantities, leads to anxiety in a telic state and excitement in a
paratelic state; humor is therefore seen as the cause of positive excitement due to the
involvement of the speaker in a non-serious or non-goal-oriented environment. Except
proper names often appear in contexts that seem very much telic, since they can be
used as default name tags for any entity that has a name in most conversations – when
there  is  no  competition  between  the  use  of  the  entity’s  name  versus  a  definition
description. Even when a company coins a humorous (sometimes disparaging) proper
name for one of its brands, such as Reckless Drivers (chauffeuring service), Ill Advisors
(medical consultants) (Rutkwoski [2016]’s examples, see Section 2), they still intend to
use that proper name as a commercial tool that will attract potential customers and
help them make a profit; the proper name is thus both goal-oriented and humorous at
the same time. This is the name that will appear on contracts and deals, and maybe in
lawsuits – all of which are neither positive nor non-serious contexts, and yet the proper
name may (or may not) still be felt as humorous upon reading as it was when originally
coined. One interesting element of this theory, though, is arousal; arousal in itself is not
positive or negative, only its effects are. It is therefore licit to compare arousal to a
certain amount of challenge from the speaker (or to the co-speaker), a challenge that
would be translated into a threat in non-humorous contexts, and merely into violation,
some linguists would say, in humorous contexts. As Veatch [1998] puts it, “Humor is
(emotional)  pain  (V)  that  doesn’t  hurt  (N)”  [V  stands  for  Violation;  N  stands  for
perception of the situation as Normal].
7 In fact, the idea that humor is to be seen as a rather benign violation, “wrong yet ok,
threatening  yet  safe”  (Warren  &  McGraw  [2016: 407]),  leads  to  two  observations:
1) aggressiveness, or some form of violence, is part of humor (as disparaging nicknames
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and demeaning jokes show, cf.  Superiority Theory) and 2) it  must be on a gradient.
Therefore, irony and sarcasm – when they are not equated in the literature as a means
of mockery and criticism via the speaker’s lack of endorsement of what they just said –
could be organized on a cline toward more aggressiveness in humor, with sarcasm at
the aggressive end (Tabacaru & Lemmens [2014]), until they become too aggressive and
lose their humorous quality (for more on the distinction between humorous and non-
humorous irony, see Dynel [2014]). On the contrary, lack of (enough) aggressiveness
with a large amount of challenge results in too much cognitive effort rather than too
much violence, and the perception of the production’s humorous quality decreases too.
An instance of wordplay, even good, that is too intellectual and too little connected to
the source expression it distorts, is not judged humorous. Giora [2002: 11-12] explains
how departing too much from the normal situation does not result in more violation
but rather in no recognition of the original normal situation, the consequence of which
is  a  misfire.  An  optimally  innovative  stimulus  that  induces  pleasure  (and  which  is
therefore equated with humor) must be a “novel response to a familiar situation” that
still allows for the [quick / easy] “recoverability of the familiar” – something that is not
familiar but not too innovative either. This is probably what awaits some humorously
coined or used proper names when they rely on homonymy or paronymy with common
nouns, adjectives or adverbs, because their reliance on linguistic knowledge suddenly
makes them very / too learned: too close to another part of speech, or too often used as
a  frequent  proper  name,  and  the  proper  name alone  (Mr. Smith  and being  a  smith)
cannot be humorous unless heavy context backs it; too creative and the connection to
the original form gets too thin to be perceived,  and no violation,  hence no humor,
ensues1. When the proper name is humorous because of the encyclopedic knowledge it
evokes,  i.e.  when  proper  names  participate  less  in  linguistic  humor  and  more  in
“cultural humor”, then no such difficulty is observed. Rather, Antonopoulou [2004: 248]
advocates for preserving proper names in translations of humorous texts because on
average,  they were judged more humorous than any replacement with a (common)
noun phrase due to their brevity, high degree of specificity and their ability to provide
“faster  access  to  concrete,  image-like  scenes  than  descriptions  (including  common
names)”.
8 These  descriptions  all  point  towards  the  idea  that,  in  humor,  what  is  funny is  the
recognition of  what is  not  (the normal situation)  that  yet  could or  should be.  This
tension  between  two  situations  –  a  theoretical,  normal  one,  and  a  (surprisingly)
different one – is at the heart of the main conceptualization of humor: incongruity, be
it  defined as  surprise /  unexpectedness,  or  a  contrast  between two opposing ideas,
meanings  or  scripts  (in  Raskin’s  then  Attardo  &  Raskin’s  terms),  or  the  difference
between  a  situation  and  a  typical  situation  (Warren  &  McGraw  [2016]).  Several
criticisms can be made that justify why the standard framework for incongruity – the
now mainstream General Theory of Humor – was not found entirely adequate for this
study, and why I chose Bergson’s primitive – because old and not entirely formalized –
theory of humor as a starting point for the study of humorous proper names. First, as
just presented, no agreement has been reached as to what incongruity precisely means.
Second, because there is doubt as to whether it is incongruity, or its resolution that
leads to humor: incongruity resolution is widely acknowledged as the cause of humor
(Mulder  &  Nijholt  [2002])  but  it  does  not  explain  why  sometimes  humor  is  found,
especially with children, when incongruity is present without the means to understand
or explain it (Forabosco [2008]). Third, because it is not certain incongruity theory is
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still  completely  sufficient  to  explain  humor,  as  it  focuses  more  on  violation  and
contrasting scripts being forced upon the co-speaker and not enough on cooperation
and the possibility of humor without contrast between simultaneous scripts; or even if
incongruity is the cause or a possible by-product of humor (Forabosco [2008], Veale
[2004]). For example, when one speaker in my corpus nicknames his step-father Cam, a
cowboy, Cowboy Cam, there is no contrast or simultaneous hold of two scripts such as
“cowboy (behavior) – not cowboy (job-description)”: what is humorous is the fact that
Cam  indeed  is  a  cowboy  and  (will  forever  remain)  only  that.  Finally,  because  this
general theory of incongruous humor is an extension of a semantic theory of humor
(Raskin’s SSTH: script-based semantic theory of humor) which, however essential, is
not the only tenet of humor – especially for proper names, where incongruity can be
found in other places such as morphosyntactic, conceptual and referential levels.
9 Section 2 deals with some aspects of semantic incongruity involving proper names, re-
joining Rutkowksi [2016]’s findings, but the main goal of this article is to show that
proper  names have the potential  to  be  humorous even before  semantic  scripts  are
involved, and that their morphosyntactic status may give rise to humorous meanings
that  play  with  the  metalinguistic  properties  and  semantic  consequences  of  their
nominal  status.  I  will  therefore  suggest  a  few metalinguistics  script  oppositions  to
describe how proper names as lexical units can be used humorously. In a way, I want to
show how proper names showcase the linguistic system they belong to and how they
use its driving forces in order to better indicate when they behave unexpectedly. Such
a description is very consistent with a mechanical view of humor, as Bergson’s theory
has been tentatively described (Attardo [2014: 78]).
10 Bergson has given a description of humor that has been regarded by many as one of the
precursors for the Incongruity Theory. His understanding of humor rests upon a few
ingredients,  first  and  foremost,  rigidification,  made  explicit  to  us  via  distraction  or 
absentmindedness, and emphasized through exaggeration.
The  laughable  element  in  both  cases consists  of  a  certain  MECHANICAL
INELASTICITY, just where one would expect to find the wide-awake adaptability
and the living pliableness of a human being. (6A) 
In the first place, this view of the mechanical and the living dovetailed into
each other makes  us  incline  towards  the  vaguer  image of  SOME RIGIDITY OR
OTHER applied to the mobility of life, in an awkward attempt to follow its lines and
counterfeit its suppleness. (14A) 
The rigid mechanism which we occasionally detect, as a foreign body, in the living
continuity  of  human  affairs  is  of  peculiar  interest  to  us  as  being  a  kind  of
ABSENTMINDEDNESS on the part of life. (28B) 
This  corrective  is  laughter,  a  social  gesture  that  singles  out  and  represses  a
special kind of absentmindedness in men and in events. (28B) 
This is the real explanation of light comedy, […] – an artificial exaggeration of a
natural rigidity in things. (33A) (Bergson [1911], my emphasis)
11 Applied  to  language  in  general,  rigidity  corresponds  to  “ready-made  formulas  and
stereotyped phrases” as well as automatized patterns of speech, or when “an absurd
idea is fitted into a well-established phrase-form” (Bergson [1991: 35B-36A]). Applied to
proper names in particular, the established form is sub-phrasal and corresponds to the
“nominal”  slot  within  a  noun  phrase,  along  with  typographic  cues  such  as
capitalization. Absentmindedness and distraction operate at two different levels: being
akin to constructed nouns, proper names may use lexical creativity as a means to arrest
the  readers’  attention  and  force  them  to  register  the  name  of  an  entity  that  is
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otherwise  automatically  used  without  even  thinking  about  it;  being  semantically
opaque and largely considered “meaningless” or lacking the same predicative meaning
as common nouns, proper names may take on more semantic weight than they usually
do,  to  the  point  that  they  are  confused  with  appellatives,  and  this  (incongruous)
mismatch between how proper  names  usually  behave  and how they  behave  in  the
context  of  a  humorous  production  reminds  the  co-speaker  of  the  (rigid)  semantic
constraints that supposedly render proper names less flexible than other nominals.
Incongruity is  therefore understood as only one part  of  the Bergsonian distraction,
albeit an important one. Finally, this perceived rigidity in the form and behavior of
proper names that culminates in the lexicalization of the unit is also how proper names
are able to magnify the possession of a certain property, thereby creating humorous
exaggeration.
 
2. Proper names, being rigid lexical units, are perfect
candidates for future humorous coinage and use
12 I have tried to show elsewhere (Philippe [2020], [2021]) that all proper names, including
proper  nouns,  are  best  described as  nominals.  A  nominal  is  the  intermediary  level
between a noun and a noun phrase: with common nouns, a nominal corresponds to the
head noun and its internal pre- and post- modifiers:
 
Table 1. Different nominal levels: nouns, nominals and noun phrases
noun car    
nominal red car United Kingdom Monet Play to the Whistle
noun phrase A red car The United Kingdom Ø Monet Ø Play to the Whistle
13 These  proper  nominals  tend  to  blend  in  with  other  nominals,  which  they  do  by
adopting the same syntactic properties as some nouns and by being very likely to be
reduced to a single unit: Talk-Talk >> TalkTalk, United Kingdom >> UK. The most successful
of them are the mono-lexical units called “proper nouns”, which look the “noun” part
the most – hence Monet usually being described as a proper noun, being a single lexical
unit, yet remaining a nominal.
14 Proper nominals are akin to constructed nouns,  as they may combine several units
(United + Kingdom, Play + to + the + Whistle) which could theoretically be analyzed both
syntactically (common nominal, clause) and semantically (a kingdom whose parts are/
have been united, a process involving participants and a whistle being blown), and yet
which must be analyzed as a whole. Play to the Whistle may have the form of a clause, as
a proper name it does not refer to a process but to a game (a “nominal” entity) and it
syntactically behaves like a noun, entering close appositions as in this example:
(1) The shows he is set to ditch include sports quiz Play to the Whistle and
daytime quiz Cash Trapped. (Mirror online)
15 The proper names Play  to  the  Whistle and Cash Trapped,  though originally  signifying
verbal or adjectival predicates, now refer to entities most aptly signified by nouns. I
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therefore argue that the creation of a proper name out of any sort of linguistic unit has
a reification effect (turning anything into a “thing”’: object, person, place, time… all
nominal referents). The concept of “reifying units” is highly relevant for this study, as
it is a first step towards lexical rigidity (which can then be amplified and/or distorted
for humorous purposes).
16 This rigid behavior is  illustrated by the impossibility to replace one element of the
proper name by another: Cash Trapped is not Money Trapped, Play to the Whistle is not Play
with a Whistle or Dance to the Whistle. This impossibility is not even due to some kind of
compositional meaning of proper nouns: even if some proper names can be analyzed
semantically, there is no guarantee that the whole proper name refers to the kind of
referent that its combined parts describe when they are not in a proper name. Take, for
instance, GrandMother’s Footsteps, a game in which one person faces a wall, counts to
three while  other  players  try  to  sneak up on them,  turns  around to  eliminate  any
player who has not stopped moving on three. There is no actual grandmother involved,
and the player representing the figurative grandmother is the one counting, not the
one approaching step by step. Likewise, Lemonade is the proper name of an album by
Beyonce, not a soft drink. In the end, English speakers must assume that there might be
no connection between what the proper name reads and what it  actually means or
refers to: a proper name does not necessarily say what the referent is – and the referent
may not be what the proper name says it is –, it just says that it is, and that it has a
name. This opacification of meaning, which corresponds to a rigid semantic constraint
on proper names, can be turned around when using a proper name with humorous
intent.
17 Rigidity also affects their referential behavior – or so the average speaker assumes, and
philosophers of language contend (Strazny [2011]). After all, proper names are mostly
famous for being “rigid designators” (in Kripke [1980]’s terms,), that is, to be uniquely
referring expressions that denote – but do not connote (Mill [1843]), i.e. do not describe
or use a stabilized set of properties to refer to an individual – the same individual in all
possible contexts (strong version) or at least in one specific context when no ambiguity
is  possible  (weak  version).  On  the  contrary,  common  nouns  are  used  to  stand  for
categories of objects drawn from a set of stable properties that will become their so-
called  “descriptive  meaning”,  and  they  will  apply  to  any  entity  possessing  these
properties. Two individuals sharing the same name (Bill1 and Bill2), or a proper name
identical  to the noun for a category of  objects (Bill and bill),  are seen as accidental
instances of homonymy. But because proper names are referentially rigid, the intended
referent is claimed to be easily recoverable and no threat to reference is posited. This
semantic rigidity has a syntactic counterpart, as most descriptions of proper names
usually  amount  to  a  list  of  syntactic  constraints  that  make  “true”  proper  names
different  from common nouns:  no  plural  suffix  and  no  visible  determiner  (barring
exceptions like the Himalayas),  lack of contrastive definiteness (Bill vs. a Bill),  lack of
(non-restrictive) modification (*Bill who is my colleague).
18 When  linguistic  research  offered  proof  that  these  rigid  patterns  were  not  always
respected (I know two Bills, I met a Bill today; Other people settled for Office Susie, so as not to
confuse her with Heroin Susie), the immediate response was to reject these examples from
the category of proper names and make them cases of recategorization into common
nouns. This choice at least meant no breach in the inherent rigidity of proper names.
Further research led to the recognition of the existence of ‘modified proper names’, i.e.
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units  still  regarded  as  proper  names  that  can,  in  certain  syntactic  and  semantic
contexts, take on properties previously restricted to common nouns. As a consequence,
syntactically less rigid proper names also become semantically less rigid. If I know two
Bills, then maybe there is a category of objects sharing the property “being called /
Bill/”, which makes proper names less rigid designators and more common noun-like,
acquiring some kind of meaning. My own syntactic and semantic description of proper
names accounts for proper names gradually taking on properties of common nouns as
they become more integrated into the noun phrase, while still retaining their status as
proper names. Note however, that nothing here is perceived as funny in I know two Bills.
But such a possible departure from their rigid behavior, which is perceived by many as
their  only  or  at  least  main  linguistic  behavior,  could be  used  humorously  when
interacting with other linguistic units in context: compare I know two Bills (no humorous
intent) and I have many b/Bills to pay (if several of your employees or creditors are called
Bill, for instance; humorous potential and perhaps humorous intent).
19 This  is  what  Rutkowski  [2016: 132-133]  focuses  on:  she  identifies  that  semantic
incongruity in proper names arises from the perception of the opposition “meaningless
–  meaningful”  juxtaposed  to  another  opposition  “name  –  not  name”  (understand:
proper  name  –  appellative / common  noun,  adjective,  etc.).  As  stated  before,  these
perceived oppositions might not be enough, and she adds context into the mix: the
context will contain elements called catalysts that will influence the reader toward a
humorous  reading.  She  also  identifies  proper  names  with  “greater  humorous
saturation (and therefore,  a  greater probability of  humorous interpretation”,  which
illustrate another opposition “neutral – not neutral”:  those proper names contain a
lexical  unit  denoting  topics  unfit  for  polite  society  (violation  of  social  norms  of
acceptable  topics  of  conversation)  such  as  colloquial  or  vulgar  words,  or  words
denoting  physiological,  scatological  or  sexual  attributes  –  Glasscock,  Hickinbottom, 
Assloss, Colon, etc. (her examples). What is humorous then is, however, not the fact that
these names convey meaning, but also connotations (added, non-distinctive semantic
values (Kerbrat-Orecchioni [1977: 18]) that have, again, a lot to do with context of use.
In that respect, disparaging names for companies, people and places are even more
humorous because they potentially violate the face-preservation principle implied in
conversational  guidelines,  by  breaking  linguistic  politeness  under  the  cover  of  the
excuse that “it’s just a name”. A greater degree of humor could therefore be achieved
when this is done purposefully, when the speaker creates a nickname (see Section 5).
Two observations can be made:
1) The opposing semantic scripts identified as relevant for humorous proper names do
not involve a contrast between extralinguistic properties attributed to a referent (“big
– small”, “nice – mean”, etc.) but between metalinguistic properties attached to the
definition of a linguistic unit: lexical category, semantic content, face-threatening act. 
2) This interpretation of humorous proper names only allows meaning to be taken into
account when it is that of the homonym appellative, but what about some meaningful
information about the referent attached to the use or coinage of a proper name? Not
having the same “descriptive” meaning as common nouns does not mean having no
meaning  at  all,  and  proper  names  could  use  that  to  elicit  humor.  This  particular
meaning, which I call associative meaning, derives properties from the encyclopedic
knowledge of the referent.
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20 As stated earlier, the reification and opacification processes at work when creating a
proper name make it impossible to restrict a proper name’s referent to the sum of the
potential referents of its parts (non-compositional structure), so that the reader has to
assume that a proper name’s referent has many more properties than the (few) ones
implied  by  its  name,  should  it  be  motivated  by  some sort  of  resemblance  with  its
referent: the United Kingdom is so much more than a kingdom united some time ago.
Proper names being expressions used to refer to qualitatively unique entities, humor
may thus arise from the reduction to some traits of the proper name’s referent, instead
of referring to their whole identity, therefore reducing them to sharing the same traits
as other (common) referents, or reducing them to archetypes (expression of degree as a
humorous device). Humor then comes not from two opposing scripts, but from leaning
too  much  into  a  single,  (over-)simplified  script,  when  proper  names  are  built  for
conveying complex and multiple extralinguistic properties at the same time.
21 One  last  linguistic  property  of  proper  names  needs  mentioning.  As  proper  names
semantically reify and syntactically nominalize, they can welcome various units that
are hard to classify elsewhere due to their unusual (non-lexical) form such as email
addresses,  combinations  of  numbers  and/or  letters  and  even  symbols  such  as
hashtagged content:
(2) There was a message at the top from aboyd@cinnamon.com. (Hawkins
[2016: 50])
(3) When she moved onto Thirteenth Street,  Arleen was receiving W-2 T,
owing mainly to her chronic depression. (Desmond [2016: 53])
(4)  I  type  “password”;  I  type  “1234”.  […]  I  cracked the  laptop password
eventually: it’s Blenheim. (Hawkins [2016: 314])
(5) Notably, none of these designers referenced anything on social media –
this is very much about an IRL, no filter rather than #nofilter view. (The
Guardian, Culture [10/01/2017])
22 Now this property does not seem to fit with the overall rigid structure of proper names,
since one might expect selection of the lexical units that can become proper names. In
fact,  almost  (if  not  exactly)  anything  can  be  turned  into  a  proper  name:  nominal,
adjectival, verbal, clausal units, grammatical items (You, the name of a TV series), so
why  not  non-lexical  forms?  What  these  illustrate  is  that  rigidity  does  not  affect
admission  into  proper  name-status, but  it  affects  the  resulting  proper  name.  As  a
consequence, these odd-looking proper names magnify this rigidification process by
being distractions par excellence. These units stop the readers in their tracks as they do
not conform to the normal aspect of lexical or grammatical units – and that is the first
step to identifying potentially humorous use of proper names.
 
3. Humor as an arresting device: inherent typographic
and morphosyntactic parameters of proper names
that can be used as a first step toward humor
23 Bergson starts his description of humor with the idea that it arrests the attention of the
audience, forcing it to notice something that it would otherwise discard. Humor lies in
the realization that something is not as fluid as it  should, that something has been
rendered  mechanical,  or  unnatural.  In  other  words,  the  first  step  to  humor  is  to
Incongruous Names: the Humorous Coinage and Use of Proper Names
Lexis, 17 | 2021
9
acknowledge that something is amiss or out-of-place, so that the reader needs to pause
and ponder on what is askew (the “hang-on” step, so to speak).
24 Of course, not all typographic devices that force the reader to take a moment to process
them are used humorously. What follows is a presentation of devices that gradually
take on humorous potential, starting with when they are used non-humorously. Such is
the case of the initial capital letter. Capitalizing proper names is a linguistic convention
in English, which does not capitalize other lexical units (the way German does all its
nouns for instance). This in turn suggests that there is a reason, in English at least, for
using  a  capital  letter  to  indicate  proper  name-status  in  addition  to  marking  the
beginning of  a  sentence.  Capital  letters  are  said to  have typographic  salience (as  a
visual mark standing out from the lower case that is regularly used), linguistic salience
(marking the beginning of a syntactically constrained unit following distinct rules) but
also  moral,  emotional  or  social  salience  (glorifying  the  referent’s  higher  status  or
qualities  by  using  an  iconically  higher  case,  Gary-Prieur  [1991],  Edwards  [1996],
Graphèmes [2010]). By being capitalized more often than not, proper names stand out
compared to the rest of the sentence: this alone does not make them humorous, but
ensures  the  reader  sees  them  and  takes  the  time  to  process  them  (and  process
whatever  humorous  intent  they may display).  Besides,  capitals  at  the  beginning or
within a proper name force the reader to acknowledge a distinct linguistic unit that
was constructed, as capitals should not occur mid-unit (NyQuil),  and to wonder why
there was a need to have such a constructed unit in the first place – looking out for
potentially missing information, going beyond what is superficially said.
(6) Elder Johnson, Bishop Dixon, Sister Atalya—none of them knew Crystal
was staying at the Lodge. Only Minister Barber knew. Crystal didn’t want
members  of  her  church to  reduce her,  to  see  her  as  an object  of  pity,  a
member of “the poor and the orphaned.” She wanted to be seen as Sister
Crystal, part of the Body, the Beloved. (Desmond [2016: 210])
In  example 6  for  instance,  humorous  potential  arises  from  the  systematic  use  of
capitals that mark a very solemn (religious, spiritual) context due to the mentions of
the  Body (of  Christ)  and  Christian  love  ( Beloved).  In  addition  to  that,  the  previous
reference to members of the Church by their (capitalised, since institutionalised) titles
of Elder,  Bishop and Sister,  makes the reader interpret Sister (Crystal) as the title of a
female servant of God – and not just a fellow Christian. This reading, suggested by the
use of the capital  letter,  is  humorous considering the troubled young woman has a
history  of  inflicting  verbal  and  physical  pain  on  others,  as  well  as  prostitution,
properties that do not exactly match the representation of a nun.
25 In the following examples, the capital letter participates in a humorous intent as it
gives set phrases proper name-status (or proper name-like status for example 8) when
they should not be analyzed as such:
(7) Perhaps he was afraid I was going to Do Something Stupid.  (Hawkins
[2016: 362])
(8) he had, as usual, reserved the entire front row, so as not to find himself
sitting next to that famous bore, God-Knows-Who (St Aubyn [2015: 240])
Example 7  shows  how  the  use  of  capital  letters  turns  the  process  signified  by  the
expression into a concept and thereby tends to lend it even more importance than the
speaker seems ready to give it, which renders the idea of “doing something stupid”
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ridiculous itself. Example 8 takes it one step further and reifies the concept by creating
a  generic  person  whose  name  would  be  the  anti-name  God-Knows-Who,  giving  an
identity to the anonymous.
(9) A short lecture, delivered at the point of arrival, entitled Are You Really
Sure You Want to Live Here: Most People Are Awful and Blame You For
Not Having Blue Passports Any More, Plus Katie Hopkins Lives Here.
(The Guardian, Opinion [10/01/2017])
This last example may already be seen as humorous even without processing what the
proper name means. The capital letter is supposed to mark the beginning of a unit yet
here,  capitals  are everywhere:  granted,  proper names allow for capitalization of  all
units to indicate both where they start and where they end, but this proliferation of
capitalized words sheds doubts on whether this proper name does end at some point,
and whether is it still a suitable proper name. This leads to a second level in humorous
use for it:  the reader realizes that probably most if  not all  of  the (short)  lecture is
contained in its title, which defies the point of a title in the first place – and defies the
point of a proper name, which is primarily to denote without connoting (too much).
Only then can the content of the title be analyzed for humor at a third, semantic level.
Typography is thus considered here the first-level entry to a layered understanding of
humorous proper names, which relies on linguistic proficiency (when to use a capital
letter, how to use a proper name and what for). Backronyms – re-creating meaning
from a word-form made of capitalized letters that do not necessarily have an expanded
form  –  and  diverted  acronyms  like  DMSO  –  Defense  Modeling  and  Simulation  Office
becoming  Defense  Meat-eating  and  Salivation  Office (Stock  &  Strapparava  [2002])  are
further evidence of that.
26 Playing with linguistic patterns is at the heart of the humorous effect associated with
coined  proper  names,  that  is,  proper  names  that  are  not  drawn  from  an  already-
existing list, but are created for fictional or advertising purposes. These include brand
names  or  book/song/artistic  work  titles  and  names  of  commercial  or  political
organizations –  which fall  into the Attention-Seeking Devices (ASD) and are closely
linked to humor (Munat [2007]). When reduced via clipping – Shop-Vac –, initialism –
G&T for Gin and Tonic – or the “often cute or amusing” blends (Lehrer [2007]) – NyQuil/
DayQuil,  Middletucky,  Brexit,  Medicare,  Febreze,  Ziploc –, when pseudo-affixed – Kleenex, 
Windex – or condensed into one lexical unit instead of several – Filet-O-Fish, Want2Stay, 
WeChat –, when resting on orthographical/phonological alteration and games – Beatles, 
Everbrite, Ziploc, Handy Andies, Sweaty Betty, Meals on Wheels – proper names force the
readers  to  slow  down  and  work  their  way  through  decoding  the  combination  and
finding the right  referent  behind the name.  Want2Stay,  for  instance,  challenges  the
readers to first identify three different sub-units (Want, 2, Stay) – which they are able to
do thanks to capitalization and use of symbols as automatic delimitators – then realize
the homophonous substitution of the infinitive particle to with the number 2 in order
to make sense of  the resulting clause (Want to  Stay)  while still  considering it  just  a
proper name. This (linguistic) effort2 has been correlated with some kind of satisfaction
at having found the solution to the pun (Balteiro & Bauer [2019]) – which the co-text
can help with (the picture of the old seaman on the crunchy cereals’ box helping not to
read Cap’n Crunch like, say, Pick’n’Save). Examples of humorous lexical creations are not
restricted to proper names, however, and belong to the category of wordplay, defined
as both creative and playful (because involving at least two inputs) word-formation by
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Renner [2015]. His account of wordplay may be interpreted as another metalinguistic
opposition script,  since  wordplay  is  seen as  torn between “two antagonistic  (albeit
coexisting)  functions  of  word-formation:  its  naming  function,  and  the  corollary
information condensation function in the specific case of complex words, and its ludic
(i.e. playful) function” (Renner [2015: 129-130]). Foregrounding of the naming property
leads  to  non-humorous  constructed terms used in  technical  fields  (“bit”,  “splake”),
foregrounding of the ludic property leads to playfulness and therefore wordplay.
27 Some proper names score very high in that respect, like numerical proper names in the
form of hashtagged content – where the hashtag replaces or complements the initial
capital  letter as a linguistic  boundary and typographic distraction.  Caleffi  [2015: 66]
notes that hashtagged messages express a very strong emotional involvement from the
speaker, which makes the # symbol equivalent to a pre-posed exclamation mark, whose
main purpose is to make sure the reader focuses on the rest of the hashtag’s content
and  its  cotext.  Gradually  used  in  advertising,  #hashtags  also  found  their  way  into
politics  and  are  often  used  as  markers  of  sarcasm  (#spasiboputinuzaeto,
‘thankstoputinforthat’, (Lunde [2016]), #FeministsAreUgly (Lawrence & Ringrose [2018]),
#DonaldTrumpTheMovie and ‘hashtaggery’ (Chiaro [2017]) in addition to being associated
with a form of exaggeration (see Kunneman et al. [2015]). Hashtagged messages may be
used humorously because of the combination of their form (condensed, typographically
and  emotionally  salient)  and  the  context  in  which  they  are  used:  #sarcasm or
#AmericanDisaster (Zappavigna  [2018])  after  a  quote  or  a  tweet  will  give  the  key  to
interpreting  the  text,  sometimes  contradicting  the  expected  interpretation.  Humor
then relies on two separate components:
1) the micro-packaging of information, which amplifies its messages by reducing it to
one single property (#sarcasm is full-blown sarcasm, see Section 5 on exaggeration and
the expression of degree), so that the reader is figuratively struck by the gap between
the (reduced) informational tone of a short text on social media and the evaluative
comment that follows, 
2) the context of usage, social media, which enables the hashtagged unit to be used as
an  iterative  marker  that  can  be  repeated  over  and  over  for  different  messages  by
various users – repetition being another humorous device described by Bergson, as it
forces the reader to observe the faulty mechanics of  a  situation,  which is  stuck on
repeat and unable to move on.
28 Hashtagged units also allow more easily for some sort of productivity that results in
humor due to the context of production. De Cock & Pizarro Pedraza [2016] analyze how
the #jesuis (#Iam)  hashtag,  originally  not  humorous at  all  as  it  meant  sympathy for
people  going  through  terrible  hardships  (gradually  moving  on  from  the  string  of
attacks in 2015 in France to anyone suffering, #jesuisMila), was turned into a comical
device  used  to  express  sympathy  for  referents  that  did  not  automatically  stir  the
public’s  sympathy,  or  even  its  interest  (#jesuisfourmi,  #jesuiscafard,  “#Iamant”,
“#Iamcockroach”). I would suggest that part of the humorous intent derives from the
mismatch between what is expected of a proper name in general (even a numerical
proper name), that is, to highlight and maybe glorify its referent, heightened by the
contextual significance of one particular proper name or proper name-base (#jesuis_),
and  the  effective  hashtagged  message  when  applied  to  something  that  the  reader
realizes should not “deserve” such treatment. In that case, humor is the result not of
the creation of the new proper name, the form of which is not incongruous, but the use
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of  that  proper  name  in  an  incongruous  context  that  activates  all  the  properties
attached to a proper name, except for one (high value of its referent). This example also
hints at the potential for humor that comes from productivity with proper names, or
how changing one component in a supposedly-rigid lexical unit gives way to a whole
new meaning that contradicts the reader’s expectations of the message and the inner
working of proper names.
 
4. Rigid, un-analyzable units and lexical alterations:
canceling the proper name or accommodating it?
29 According  to  Bergson,  humor  derives  from  a  break  in  the  (language)  flow  that
highlights a certain form of rigidity that should not be there, jamming an overused
system; but proper names being rigid lexical units that cannot be altered, it is precisely
trying not to use them rigidly that makes the reader notice that something is out of
place, or character.
30 Unless  the  typographic  devices  presented  in  section 3  are  striking  enough,  a  non-
humorous proper name is almost forgotten right after the reader has read it. A proper
name being the default means to refer to an entity if it is known, it should not stand out
in  order  to  ease  communication  –  hence  the  set  of  conventions  such  as  rigid
designation, no possible lexical alteration or semantic weight that the reader can rely
on to  make  it  a  necessarily  odd yet  familiar  unit  in  the  textscape.  If  any  of  these
parameters change, then the reader’s attention will not be primarily on the rest of the
message; instead, it will be diverted to the proper name in order to understand why it
does not  behave as  it  should.  Compare two situations:  a  fashion show with models
wearing  a  t-shirt  reading  Boss  International (a  well-known  fashion  name),  and  one
wearing a Loss International t-shirt. While the first proper name is expected in context
and will barely be noticed, the second, having been created as a clear by-product of the
first  one,  will  draw attention  onto  itself,  and  make  the  audience  question  its  very
existence.  By  making  proper  names  less  rigid,  humorous  uses  force  the  reader  to
recognize that there should be something rigid in the system in order for the rest of the
sentence to take precedence. This is a highly metalinguistic feature of proper name
humor, as it comes from the reader’s direct recognition that a linguistic rule has been
broken. In the remainder of this section, I analyze various forms that this misshaping of
proper names can take as well as the kind of consequence it has on how the proper
name and its referent are conceived by the reader.
31 Hashtags are not the only proper names that can be productive,  or re-produced.  If
some proper names have to be thought in terms of a series – World War I/II or First/
Second World War; London 2012, Rio 2016 – so that mirrored patterns are not humorous but
expected, other proper names re-using previous proper name material are doomed to
become problematic and therefore humorous.
(10) Didier, on the other hand, he dreaded seeing […] because he was always
trying to get Alan to publish his books in England. His latest assault had been
at a drinks party at Katherine’s when he’d been trying to peddle his new
book, Qu’est-ce que la Banalité?. […] “I’m sorry,” Alan said sensibly, “but we
can’t  publish  a  book  in  England  called,  What  is  Banality?.”  “Call  it  The
Anatomy  of  Banality,”  suggested  Didier,  following  Alan  into  the  kitchen.
“This will  appeal to Anglo-Saxon materialism, and also the echo with The
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Anatomy of Melancholy signals that it’s a serious work, no?” “Of all the things
that don’t need analysing,” Alan began, but Didier interrupted him straight
away. (St Aubyn [2015: 55])
A French philosopher is confronted to several difficulties when trying to sell his book
to an English publisher. Regardless of the contents of the book, he doesn’t see how his
choices of book titles (proper names) are unfortunate, for several reasons that pertain
to the fabric of a proper name. First, unless they’re fictional and motivated (Professor
Sprout in J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter >> Pr. Chourave in the French translation by Jean-
François Ménard) or they come from the same root as other commonly used names
(John, Jean, Yoann, Johannes) proper names are not supposed to be translatable: it is one
of  their  traditionally  defining  properties,  along  with  lack  of  determination,
modification and meaning.  When proper names are translated,  they’re very seldom
done so word for word: by trying to get the English title to resemble the French one,
the author in example 10 completely misses the point of a proper name, which is to be a
highly context-dependent and language-dependent unit that cannot cross languages
without  getting noticed.  At  this  stage,  the  proper  name What  is  Banality? would  be
equivalent to a foreign unit that does not exactly fit the English pattern, and a unit that
is not entirely suitable as a name/title. Then, in an attempt to conform to the said-
English pattern, the author tries another proper name that is directly inspired from an
already-existing one. The process is roughly the same as with the #jesuis hashtags and
the result is jarring too. In addition to ridiculing the second referent (lending as much
philosophical interest to banality as to melancholy, something the English publisher
doubts should be done), it also backfires on the referent of the original proper name.
For descriptive proper names at least, which are coined for a specific referent whose
uniqueness is iconically mirrored by its unique denomination, repetition of the same
lexical  pattern for another referent which has no ties  to the original  one can only
deprive it of part of its originality. Indeed, by creating The Anatomy of Banality out of The
Anatomy  of  Melancholy,  without  justifiable  connection  between  the  two  works,  the
French author is creating a lexical base, or placeholder, The Anatomy of _ that would, in
his mind, apply to any “serious work”, regardless of its impact, relevance, genre, and so
on. In fact,  what is  humorous is  this casual reference to a marketing strategy as it
makes the reader realize the existence of this rigid placeholding, mechanical function
of some titles in real life, since it is indeed being used outside fiction. Google Books
shows countless works entitled The Anatomy of  Racial  Attitudes/Grief/Peace/Fake News/
Consumerism/Desire/Sport Injuries/Yes, etc., rendering The Anatomy of_ a generic form for
any  book  title,  regardless  of  the  book’s  unique  features.  The  French  philosopher’s
argument is therefore that his book’s originality is best exemplified by the use of an
oversold formula that does anything but make its referent unique. This rigidified book
naming strategy can be translated into the following opposing meta-scripts: “original –
not original”, “uniquely referring expression – generic placeholder” that derive from
the more general “fit – unfit (proper name)” script.
32 For the same referent, what might seem like a minor alteration to its name may also
result in ridicule. By minor alteration, I do not mean the addition of suffixes that would
lead to the recategorization of the unit into a (verbal) predicate. Take the example of a
novel competition called the Elysian Prize: as rounds of selection go by, some authors
will appear on the Long List (first round) then on the Short List (second round) before the
winner is  announced.  The selected candidates  are called Long-listed then Short-listed
authors, and they may be congratulated on their Short-Listing. This is not humorous but
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derivational use of proper names. Instead, humor-inducing alterations are those which
occur within the proper name itself, corresponding to a paradigmatic change of one or
several of its morphological / phonological components.
33 Consider these alterations to the proper names, by two different characters,  one of
whom is not a native speaker:
(11) He could imagine that the press would want to make a bigger splash by
synchronizing all the profiles […] with the explosive appearance of Mulberry
on  the  Elysian  Big  List.  [Sonny,  an  Indian  grandee  full  of  delusions
concerning his novel and his own importance]
(12)  “I  am  the  speech  writer  for  one  of  the  Small-Listed authors,”  said
Didier, hardly able to contain his mirth. [the French philosopher] (St Aubyn
[2015: 42-43, 225])
By replacing Long by Big and Short by Small, one could argue that no significant change
has  been  forced  onto  the  original  referent.  After  all,  if  the  list  is  a  Long  List,  it’s
probably big, and if the list is a Short list, then there is a smaller number of authors on
it; the alteration is minor due to the near-synonymy or semantic closeness between the
adjectives long/big and short/small. Part of the humorous effect comes from the “trace of
meaning” (in Raynaud’s words [1977: 27-28]) that justified the replacement of a word by
another: long and big or short and small may be synonyms in some contexts, but not in
others, mis-using one for another can lead to an amusing gap in meaning. However,
with  proper  names  it  goes  beyond  the  simple  momentary  inadequacy;  whereas
someone may be able to re-construct to be short-sighted from to be small-sighted, or to be a
big girl from to be a long/huge girl, I would argue that replacing part of a proper name by
a close synonym does not just deform the proper name, it sometimes cancels it. It is so
because,  contrary to phrasal  lexical  items (Kuiper [2007])  which may be altered for
humorous purposes and still  be recognizable,  more lexicalized units such as proper
nominals rely on their fixed frame to keep their naming function. Saying that there is a
Small/Big List is not naming the list by its name, it is saying that the list is very small/
big  indeed.  With  near-synonymy,  so-called  descriptive  proper  names  –  whose
descriptive parts should not be automatically understood as characterizing the referent
even if they very often do (see Section 1.) – truly become descriptive expressions and
therefore  less  of  proper  names.  Rather,  Big  List and  Small  List would  be  closer  to
nicknames, emphasizing one aspect of the List without properly naming it – hence the
idea that the Small List is somehow smaller than the Short List (Section 5). In addition to
turning the reader’s attention to the meta-linguistic rigid structure of proper names,
this acts as a meta-judgement on the linguistic proficiency of the speaker who made
that  mistake,  which  in  turn  participates  in  a  broader  humorous  mockery  of  the
character as a whole: Sonny has submitted a novel everyone thinks is a pompous drag
that shows he does not understand how to properly write a novel, so it is only fit he
should not know how to properly name the writing contest he has entered. As seen in
example 10, Didier is more interested in being part of the literary scene than he is in
understanding the subtleties of that scene, so replacing Short List by Small List is very
consistent with previous linguistic violations.
34 Perhaps the proper name’s original purpose does not always disappear altogether, so it
would be too strong to speak of canceling the proper name, when it only distorts it or
even accommodates it. This is particularly relevant when a distorted proper name is
intended for another referent than the original proper name’s, and when permutation
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is replaced with addition of linguistic material. Consider A Brave New Arctic, the title of a
documentary showcasing how scientists from all around the world work hand in hand
to save the Arctic (positive connotation), derived from the title of the dystopian novel A
Brave  New  World,  depicting  a  frightening  society  governed  by  new  technological
advances. Reference to the source proper name is not cancelled but distorted enough to
mean the  opposite  (glorification  vs.  fear  of  technology,  approval  or  disapproval  of
humankind), with a possible suggestion that the ultimate source of inspiration for the
name, whose positive connotations had already been distorted in Huxley’s novel, are
rehabilitated in the documentary’s  title (Shakespeare’s  The Tempest 1.5.183-184:  How
beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, / That has such people in’t!).
35 Proper  names  may  either  be  the  targets  of  the  alteration  or  its  instruments.  For
instance, a proper name inserted in a larger syntactic unit it does not normally belong
to will – of course – influence its interpretation but not necessarily cancel its original
meaning. In Show me the Monet, the title of an article detailing the heist that took place
in a museum (Mariaule [2008: 63]), the proper name Monet is a transparent replacement
for money in the original expression (show me the money). However, it is only due to their
close homonymy (Monet and money being quasi-homographs and, to a lesser extent,
quasi-homophones – “traces of forms”) that the reader is able to retain some sort of
connection with a robbery. Indeed, replacing money by any other proper name (show me
the Rembrandt / show me the Long List) might not have been enough for the reader to
keep the original expression in mind, as other expressions might have been available
(such as “Show me the meaning”, a song title). What happens then is that even as the
proper name Monet stops the immediate interpretation of the expression, its formal
proximity  to  the  word  it  replaces  also  forces  the  reader  to  accommodate  the
expression’s new meaning with some property associated with the proper name: if show
me the money is still recognizable, then some of its meaning must be kept (“robbery”), if
Monet was added, then something in connection with its referent fits into the semantic
frame of a robbery (Monet refers to a painter and by extension, to his paintings, which
are deemed valuable, thus worth being robbed): hence the delayed interpretation of an
art robbery.
36 Most of this pun is due to the paronymy between Monet and money, a linguistic tool
frequently observed in press titles. Analyzing titles such as Tout fou Lacan (“everything
is going to the dogs” + fou “crazy” + Lacan “psychoanalyst fond of puns”), Lettres et le
néant (from Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant – “being” vs. “letters”) or even We have a dream,
Sullet-Nylander  [2018: 247;  251]  describes  their  main  strategy  as  a  linguistic  and
cultural  défigement,  or  de-rigidification,  a  process  whereby  a  set  phrase  or  fixed
expression / unit is being remotivated without changing the overall meaning of the
source  expression  (linguistic  de-rigidification)  and  relying  on  cultural  landmarks
(cultural de-rigidification). Even though proper names should be banned from such de-
rigidification processes, she notices that no such thing happens, as proper names have
a prominent position in these de-rigidified patterns in her corpus. This de-rigidification
is mostly achieved through paronymy, which is the main ingredient of Rabatel [2011a],
[2001b]’s  explanation  of  humorous  proper  names  as  illustration  of  an  à  peu  près
(“approximation” figure). Monet and money, Loss and Boss (International) are panonymic
in that there is at least one orthographic or phonological permutation leading to the
approximation of the proper name’s referent with that of the resulting altered lexical
unit. Rabatel explains that these alterations allow for the cumulative perception of the
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denomination value of proper names as well as the representation of the properties of
the  paronymic  signifier  (something  is/has  been  “lost”  with  brands  like  Boss
International), which he uses to highlight the linguistic relevance of opposing points of
view even when referring to individuals by their name, and their subsequent potential
to  stand  for  a  generic  category  of  referents  (back  to  the  “categorizing  –  not
categorizing”, “name – not a name / a common noun” meta-scripts).  Genericity has
already been mentioned twice as a tool or a by-product of humorous proper names, but
it implies that properties of the proper name’s referent are somehow targeted to be the
source of humor. This remains to be investigated.
 
5. Typicality, exaggeration and lexicalization: proper
names and degree as humorous devices
37 The  last  humorous  strategies  Bergson  identifies  are  exaggeration  and  repetition,
because they both magnify a rigid property either qualitatively or quantitatively. I have
already mentioned that some humorous uses of proper names seemed to express a high
or higher quality of their referent (Cowboy Cam, erroneous Small List vs. Short List). There
is in fact evidence that proper names have the potential to signify some kind of degree
and that this property may be used for humorous purposes, especially famous proper
names.
(13) It would, however, be a crime of Al Capone proportions not to have a
Chicago-style deep pan pizza on your visit. (Mirror online [06/02/2017])
(14) After all, it wasn’t every day that one found oneself enjoying Versailles
levels of unabashed French luxury, with the welcome addition of modern
plumbing. (St Aubyn [2016: 205])
In  both examples,  Al  Capone and Versailles could be replaced by huge or  great,  even
extreme (as such, they would be called boosters in Paradis [2000]’s typology of degree
modifiers); these adjectives, however, would probably fall short of describing how great
the crime is, or how luxurious the speaker’s situation is. It therefore seems that the
proper  name  means  the  highest  possible  degree  of  “greatness”  in  these  particular
examples.  Fauconnier  [1975: 353]  would  analyze  these  proper  names  as  “pragmatic
superlatives” able to denote the highest point on a property scale: average proportions –
great proportions – Al Capone proportions.
38 One may wonder why or how these proper names are able to signify “much of” and
even “the biggest amount of”. Al Capone is primarily used to refer to a person, Versailles
to a place, so neither of them seem to be good candidates to modify a noun expressing a
certain quantity. In fact, research on proper name modifiers (Breban [2018]) shows how
(non-modified) proper names could be used to refer to more than just their referent: Al
Capone and Versailles would be instances of a typifying use of proper name modifiers,
and  would  mean  “that  is  reminiscent  of /  typical  of /  possessing  some  properties
associated  with”  that  proper  name’s  referent.  This  means  that  the  degree-
interpretation  is  derived  from  the  encyclopedic  knowledge  of  their  referents,  that
something in the referents of Al Capone and Versailles suggests greatness or grandeur.
Admittedly, not all parts of Versailles are blessed with “unabashed French luxury” and
Al Capone was a man of average height. In order for the reader to understand this
particular degree-modification, they have to know which properties of their referents
are relevant in context; mentions of crime and Chicago should trigger the memory that
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Al Capone was the most famous gangster in Chicago, so that he is a reference when it
comes to crime and Chicago;  Versailles,  French and luxury will  most  likely make the
reader think of former times when Versailles was home to kings like Louis XIV who
gave Versailles their reputation as a place of wealth. Humorous interpretation arises
from two distinct facts, repetition of the quality and the connected exaggeration of the
quality for a referent which probably did not require such saturation of that quality.
The “typical of” and “great amount of” readings of Versailles and Al Capone are triggered
by their insertion in contexts which already mention the properties for which they
were quoted. It should not come as a surprise, then, that Bolinger’s account of proper
names  as  intensifiers  appears  in  a  section  on  “Redundancy  and  its  formalization”
(Bolinger [1972: 156]). Proper names, or epithets, express an evaluative comment that
repeats the main part of the message so that intensification is achieved (She is such a
Florence Nightingale that the ill and inform flock to her). Humor here, seems to come from
the excessive saturation of one script, through repetition but also through the use of a
proper name whose referent is probably too great for the description that is effectively
intended. Not eating a Chicago hot dog when visiting Chicago does not get you fined,
imprisoned or killed: the opposing scripts “crime – not a crime” is triggered by the
reference to a crime being committed; what Al Capone does is it outbids crime in the
expression of the “crime” script, which furthers the humorous intention, rather than
creating it. If an opposition script were to be drawn from the use of the proper name, it
would again be a metalinguistic one – one that has to do with the pragmatic relevance
of invoking this proper name’s referent to compare its properties with the intended
referent (not eating a Chicago hotdog, staying at the Paris Ritz),  when the status of
proper names as pragmatic superlatives makes it impossible to ever reach their level.
39 Another  source  of  humor  involving  this  degree-reading  is  when  one  observes  a
mismatch between the theoretical pragmatically superlative function of proper names
and the realization that they are not pragmatic superlatives in context (“pragmatic
superlative – not pragmatic superlative” opposition script). Analyzing degree-proper
name modifiers, Vartiainen [2019] finds that some of them may be used humorously
precisely  because  they  contradict  the  readers’  expectation  of  a  typical  example  of
greatness. She gives the following example from The Simpsons:
(15)  That  Milhouse  is  going  to  be  big.  Gabby  Hayes big!  (Vartiainen
[2019: 909])
She explains that even if Gabby Hayes was quite a successful actor in Western movies,
he could not be considered the typical example of a successful actor. This makes for the
humorous conclusion of this cue, as the reader who knows the degree-proper name
construction expects a typical  example of  success that would naturally confirm the
statement that Milhouse is going to be “big”, only to be stopped by the unexpected
choice of the actor. They would have to think about how good an actor Gabby Hayes is,
before concluding that since it is not the most natural choice, the foregone conclusion
that Milhouse is going to be successful must be reassessed. In that particular example,
Gabby  Hayes is  an  incongruous  choice  of  degree-proper  name,  which  is  due  to  his
referent not being a paragon [2019: 909].
40 A paragon is the typical representative of a “type of thing”. Al Capone, for instance,
could  be  the  paragon of  gangsters,  Hercules  that  of  strong men,  Versailles  that  of
luxurious places. A paragon typically exceeds the quality that they represent: being a
superlative is not so far from being an exaggerated version of some property. Proper
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names excel  at  creating paragons,  especially  in the context  of  antonomasia:  it’s  the
Kentucky Derby of drugs; a vast Pacific of unemployment. But in order to be paragons, they
have to perform two distinct operations: they have to filter out all properties of their
referent but the one(s) they are supposed to embody perfectly, and they have to do so
to the point that it becomes exaggerated. This is why Gary-Prieur [2001] observes that
it is easier to create paragons by making use of characters from the Greek mythology,
fiction and literature pre-dating realistic novels, as they still represent types that do
not have many distinctive properties to begin with. Such a remark echoes Bergson’s
point that characters from comedies, rather than tragedies, have their names used to
exemplify types, precisely because a tragic character has to be complex – torn between
at least two sides – whereas comedies present types that come close to caricatures,
which he defines as follows:
The  art  of  the  caricaturist  consists  in  detecting  this,  at  times,  imperceptible
tendency, and in rendering it  visible to all  eyes by magnifying it.  He makes his
models  grimace,  as  they  would  do  themselves  if  they  went  to  the  end of  their
tether. (Bergson [1911: 10b])
41 The writer who uses a proper name as a degree-modifier, in antonomasia, or even in
creating  nicknames,  is  a  kind  of  caricaturist.  Note  that  what  is  really  humorous
according to Bergson is  the process of  making it  visible,  the ongoing exaggeration,
rather than the well-known rigid figure of a typical character. This is probably why live
antonomasia, rather than lexicalized antonomasia, is a greater source of humor, as it
still enables the reader to compare the original referent with the model and to find
their  shared  property  without  being  told  which  one  it  is  immediately (Leroy
[2001: 301-303]).
42 Proper names also have the added property of solidifying that exaggeration. Nicknames
may start as a caricature, but they can quickly become the only identity available for
the referent, which becomes stuck in an archetypal version of itself.
(16) The police officers were sitting on the sofa in the living room, a fortysomething
man in plain clothes and a younger one in uniform with acne on his neck. […] He
told  me  the  other  officer’s  name  as  well,  but  I  don’t  remember  it.  I  wasn’t
concentrating. […] “I need to sit down,” I said, and the detective motioned for me to
take his place on the sofa, next to Neck Acne. […] Neck Acne had a notebook out,
pencil raised. I could hear the scratch of Neck Acne’s pencil on paper, I could hear
the blood pounding in my ears. […] He glanced over at Neck Acne, then back at me.
[several hundred pages down] They went away and left me there, with a uniformed
officer—the one with the neck acne who came to Cathy’s flat in Ashbury a
lifetime ago—standing at the door, avoiding my eye. (Hawkins [2016: 99-103, 404])
In a very stressful, humor-deprived situation, the narrator in this excerpt cannot help
but notice a distracting feature of one of her interlocutors. She fixates on it and soon
creates a nickname that quickly replaces the official name of that police officer and
becomes the only way she refers to him, or even thinks of him when she sees him again
months later (end of the quote).  A thorough discussion of the relationship between
proper names,  degree and categorization would require  more space than a  passing
remark in this article, but I would like to suggest the following idea: proper names,
being lexicalized units, can only rigidify some features of their initial referent when
they  adopt  a  common  noun-like  semantic profile;  instead  of  the  complex  set  of
properties they can derive from their referent when they still have an associative kind
of meaning,  proper names behaving like common nouns see their  meaning become
more “predicative” or “descriptive”, in the sense that a definition / description can
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now be attached to the proper name, and this definition is necessarily short(ened) and
restricted to only a few properties of the initial referent. This process is not humorous
in  itself,  but  it  can  be  used  to  explain  why  non-neutral  nicknaming  (Section 2)  is
perceived as humorous. If the nickname was motivated at first, then the proper name
will retain the connection between the referent and its described property for as long
as  it  is  deemed  relevant  in  context.  Because  of  the  naming  convention  between  a
proper name and its referent, even disparaging naming becomes the only way to refer
to a referent, and lexicalization coupled with selection of / reduction to the relevant
features will  imprison it  in the role of  an unwilling paragon of  sorts (the future ex-
Mr Mom for one man in the series of men that the writer’s mom dates during his youth,
Cowboy Cam for another step-father who is only known through his occupation because
no other (personal) feature was deemed relevant enough, etc.). Once again, a script-
oriented interpretation of this humorous process would require metalinguistic scripts




43 Throughout this paper, I have tried to show how proper names could be analyzed as
humorous devices using the framework of incongruity resolution theory, particularly
drawing on the Bergsonian theory of rigidification. Proper names make use of their
rigid lexical format to highlight any minor change to their form or meaning in context
and exaggerate its  consequences on the overall  meaning of  the sentence or on the
resulting status of the proper name. Because they are rigid, proper names do not allow
near synonyms or near homonyms to replace one of their parts, but they may be used
as near homonyms to common nouns in order to alter the meaning of more flexible
lexical  patterns.  Their high degree of  lexicalization also tends to amplify any of its
referent’s  properties  that  become  associated  with  it,  so  that  they  soon  become
caricatural.  In order to be understood as humorous,  they often need to have other
elements in the near context that will repeat or signal the property that the reader
should select with respect to the proper name’s referent. I  thus believe that proper
names  do  illustrate  the  traits  of  rigidification,  repetition  and  exaggeration  that
characterize humor in Bergson’s account and allow for the creation of metalinguistic
opposition scripts in the framework of incongruity resolution theory, of which I have
suggested a few throughout this paper.
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NOTES
1. Giora uses departures from the expression Body and soul and subjects’ judgments of humor to
determine what is optimally innovative / humorous: the plural form Bodies and souls was deemed
too familiar to be humorous, the paronymic proper names Bobby and Saul too creative, but the
expression body and sole (with the homophone for “soul” the only departure from the original
expression) was deemed humorous and therefore optimally innovative.
2. This effort need not be translated into a longer reading time. Names of domains in website
addresses –  which have been compared and,  in some cases,  assimilated to brand names and
slogans  (Handler  [2018: 295])  –  may  take  part  in  humorous  productions  involving  lexical
creativity, but they do not hamper reading and processing as long as they are short. Wordplay is
also associated, in Freud’s theory of humorous economy of words and condensation of thoughts,
with  the  economy of  psychic  release  involved  in  processing  the  playful  production (Ruchon
[2018]).
ABSTRACTS
This paper analyses how proper names fit in the incongruity resolution theory of humor, more
specifically  Bergson  (1911)’s  theory  of  humor  as  rigidification  (and  related  distraction  and
exaggeration). The relevant properties of proper names, such as their rigid format and semantic
unanalysability, their high degree of lexicalization, and their potential role as parangons, are
explained in order to suggest possible metalinguistic script oppositions that could describe how
proper names, as lexical units, are used in humorous contexts.
Cet article s’intéresse aux liens entre les noms propres en anglais et les théories de l’humour
fondées sur l’incongruité et sa résolution, en particulier la théorie bergsonienne de la raideur
mécanique  et  des  phénomènes  adjacents  de  distraction  et  exagération  (1911).  Le  figement
morphosyntaxique des noms propres, leur impossible analyse sémantique, leur haut degré de
lexicalisation et  leur capacité à devenir des parangons sont étudiés afin de faire émerger de
potentielles  oppositions  de  scripts  expliquant  comment  les  noms  propres,  en  tant  qu’unités
lexicales, favorisent la production d’un humour reposant sur des bases métalinguistiques.
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